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-- Abstract -- 
 
 
The talk addresses the relation between the two idealist thinkers F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. 
Hegel in their first joint public appearance in 1801. Thereby, the paper puts forward a twofold 
claim: On the one hand, both philosophers share the assumption that the true standpoint of 
philosophy may only be determined as the absolute identity of spirit and nature. On the other 
hand, however, both differ quite fundamentally in how precisely to understand this principle 
of absolute identity. Schelling conceives of the true principle of philosophy as an identity 
which is, in its essence, absolutely free of any difference. Hegel, however, puts forward a 
notion of identity as ‘identity of identity and non-identity’, that is to say, as an identity 
essentially structured by difference.  
The talk unfolds these different notions of identity in Schelling’s “Presentation of my 
System of Philosophy” and Hegel’s “The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s 
Philosophy”. Thereby, the talk seeks to show that the main reason for this distinction between 
the two thinkers is a difference in their critique of their predecessor J.G. Fichte, the ‘founder’ 
of German Idealism. Schelling, around 1800, criticizes Fichte’s principle of the ‘absolute I’ as 
being a one-sided, merely subjective notion. He complements Fichte’s (idealist) philosophy of 
the I with a second (realist) philosophy of nature, and unites both in the standpoint of absolute 
identity. Hegel fully affirms this stance taken by Schelling, yet he at the same time develops a 
specifically systematic critique of Fichte on his one. Namely, he criticizes the fact that Fichte 
thinks of the I as a pure identity (the ‘I = I’) and thus fails in explaining difference (the non-I) 
in starting form this principle. Although addressed merely at Fichte, this critique structurally 
also applies to Schelling’s understanding of absolute identity in 1801, albeit tacitly and 
inexplicitly.  
Finally, the paper indicates that this early disagreement already foreshadows Schelling’s 
and Hegel’s explicit dispute, taking place some years later, surrounding Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 and his polemics against an absolute identity in which ‘all 
cows are black’.   
